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THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN 
- On the Public Works PrograIn for Relief to FarIners in 1930s-
By Tomohiro OKADA* 
I Introduction 
29 
The "Showa Panic" which was a link of the World Great Depression in 1930s, had 
been a major turning point of the prewar Japanese capitalism.!) The agricultural cri-
sis which took place at about the same time was an acute blow to rural population 
who had already been suffering from continued recession." In addition to this, 
pressure from colonial agriculture on the one hand and drastic restructuring of domes-
tic industry which was a result of rapid industrial rationalization by the monopoly 
capitalism on the other hand, caused an extensive privation of domestic farmers as 
well as "antagonism between town and country". Under these circumstances, and 
shortly following the notorious "May 15" coupd'etat attempt, the coalition cabinet 
decided to undertake a series of measures to save impoverished farmers. 
The Emergency Relief Measures, "Jikyoku Kyokyu Jigyo", are the object of this 
research," and the new policy marked a sort of "turning point of Japanese agriculture 
policy", of which an important aspect was the government policy for rural develop-
ment. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, the policy has been carried over 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University. 
I) This type of perception can be seen in Harumaru Inoue and Seijiro Usami, Kikiniokeru 
Nihon Shihonshugino Kozo (The Structure oj Japanese Capitalism under Crisis), Iwanami Shoten, 
1951 (in japanese). The work of Kaichiro Ohishi, "Sekai Daikyoko to Nihon Shihonshugi" 
(The Great Depression and japanese Capitalism); in Kaichiro Ohishi ed., Nippon Teikoku-
shugishi, 2-Sckai Dai Kyoko (History of Imperialism in Japatl - 2, The World Panic), Tokyo 
University Press, 1987 (in japanese), offers a comprehensive overview of researches made 
in the past on this subject. 
2) As for actual depressed state of farmers at that time, refer to the Nihon Nogyo Nenpo 
(japan Agricultural Yearbook), Vol. 1, by "Nippon Nogyo Kenkyukai" (Japan Agricultural 
Research Institute), Kaizosha, 1932 (in Japanese), and Shuzo Teruoka, Nihon Nogyo 
Mondaino Tenkai (Development qr Agricultural Issues oj Japan), Vol. 2, Tokyo University Press, 
1984 (in Japanese). Chapter 5. 
3) Apart from the Emergency Relief Measures mentioned, there were other actions, taken, 
such as introduction of the Rice Control Law and measures to support silk prices. In 
this paper, I confines my study to the Emergency Relief Measures, and above all to the 
Public Works Program for Relief. because they constituted the main part of the overall 
policies and thus had a direct impact on rural economies themselves, as an attempt for 
their restructuring. 
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into the postwar period, and secondly, because it had much in common with regional 
development policies of other developed countries who were simultaneously struck 
by the Great Dpression. 
The Emergency Relief Measures were remarkable for their scale. In terms of 
budgetary appropriations, they reached 860 million yen in three fiscal years from 
September, 1932 to 1934, of which 560 million was disbursed by the state and 300 
million by local authorities. In considering the fact that the total budget was no 
more than 2 billion yen at the time, the Emergency Relief Measures represented 
"something quite comparable to New Deals"", and almost all of them were financed 
by deficit-financing bonds. In other words, they weren't gotten into shape without 
a shift to the new system of managed currency. 
The Emergency Relief Measures consisted of the "Public Works Program for 
Relief to Farmers" and the "Movement for Reconstruction of Rural Economy", of 
which the former was predominant in terms of spending (above 80% in fiscal year 
1933)5) According to Fumio Goto, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry at that 
time, the Public Works Program for Relief represented "emergency measures", while 
the Movement for Reconstruction of Rural Economy was considered as a "permanent 
policy" .S) 
Ken-ichi Miyamoto once called that the Emergency Relief Measures marked the 
starting point of regional development policy in Japan", but no positive study has 
yet been made in this context. I propose to review the Public Works Program for 
Relief to Farmers, which occupied the crucial part of the Emergency Relief Measures, 
to see how they grew into a comprehensive regional development policy in this coun-
try. By doing so, I try to show the process in which the capital gradually subsumed 
rural economy, while expanding market and transformed rural economy as the outco-
me of this policy. 
Broadly speaking, the Public Works Program for Relief to Farmers consisted of 
the "Rural Public Works" undertaken by the Ministry of Interior and the "Agricul-
tural Public Works" pursued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The for-
mer consisted of public works relating to road, flood control and ports and under-
taken by each of the state, prefecture, and local municipalities, the last two of which 
4) Ken-ichi Miyamoto, "Showa Kyoko to Zaisei Seisaku" (The Showa Panic and Fiscal 
Policy) in Hazama Genzo ed., Koza Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsushiron (History of Development 
of Japanese Capitalism), Vol. III, Nippon Hyoronsha, 1968 (in japanese), p. 199. 
5) Ken-ichi Miyamoto, ibid., p. 198. 
6) Economic Reconstruction Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Daiikkai 
Nason Keizai Kosei Chua Iinkai Yoroku (Summary of Proceedings of the First ,Uc(/ting of Central 
Committee for Reconstruction of Rural Ecollomy), 1933 (in japanese), p. 21. 
7) Ken-ichi Miyamoto, Shakai Shihonron (Social CapitalJ revised edition), Yuhikaku, 1976 (in 
Japanese), p. 61. Also, ref. Shigehiro Tanaka, "Takahashi Zaiseino Sangyo Narabini 
Chiiki Seisaku" (The Industrial and Regional Policy under the K. Takahashi's Finance) 
in Keizai Ronso (The Economic Review of Kyoto Universit)'), Vol. 113, No.4 and 5, 1974 (in 
japanese ). 
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received high subsidies as well as funds derived from issuance of local bonds or low 
-interest loans made by the government. On the other hand, the Agricultural Public 
Works comprised those works on arable land, forestry as well as fishery. Compared 
on the basis of the budget for fiscal year 1933, we see that the Rural Public Works, 
costing 120 million yen, were far more important than the Agricultural Public Works 
which took no more than 50 million yen.8l 
Although there were a number of studies made On the Public Works Program for 
Relief, a majority of them merely focused their attention to those partial aspects such 
as lack of consistent planning, dishonest behavior of landowners, contractors or civil 
servants, beneficial impact on industry by massive procurement of construction ma-
terials, and added burden on the part of farmers owing to taxation, contribution in 
terms of money and labor, ets., usually concluding that "these undertakings did little 
to benefit panic-stricken farmers" .9) Practically, none of these studies eVer tried to 
make any comprehensive, objective and serious analysis of the public works them-
selves. 
A noteworthy exception is the research published by Takafusa Nakamura,lO) as 
he properly point to the effects of public spending. But he tends to emphasis it too 
much to ignore an important function of these "public" investment as a means of 
accumulation of capital. Also, his study does not include those works undertaken 
by the Ministry of Interior. In view of these shortcomings in the past research, I 
believe that following approaches are necessary to gain a more comprehensive under-
standing of the subject matter: 
First, to clarify historical significance of the Public Works Program for Relief 
with regard to the development phase of capitalism. 
Second, in studying those social means of labor such as roads and port facili-
ties, a distinction must be made between process of construction and process of 
functioning of these facilities as the social means of labor,ll) because the main 
shortcoming of earlier researches consisted of the lack of such distinction and their 
excessive attention to the construction processes themselves, with all their scandalous 
aspects. 
Third, we must draw a clear line between the works undurtaken by the Ministry 
of Interior and those pursued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, because 
8) Ken-ichi Miyamoto, ibirl., p. 198. 
9) Takemaro Mari, "Nihon Fasizumu no Keiseito Nason Keizai Kosei Undo" (Origin of the 
Facism in Japan and rhe Movement for Reconstruction of Rural Economy) in Rekishigaku 
Kenkyu (Journal Qf Historical Studies), special issue, October, 1971 (in Japanese), p. 139. 
This is typical of most studies done on the subject So far. 
10) Takafusa Nakamura "Takahashi Zaisei to Kokyo Toshi Seisaku" (Budgetary Policy of 
Finance Minister Takahashi and Public Spending) in Takafusa Nakamura ed., ScnkankinQ 
Nippon Keizai Bunseki (Analysis of Japanese Economy Between Two World Wars), Yamakawa 
Press, 1981 (in Japanese). 
11) Jun Ikegami, Gendai Shiho'lShugi Zaiseirorz (Modern Capitalism and Public Finance), Yuhikaku, 
1974 (in Japanese), p. 158 and p. 166. 
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their inherent characteristics are rather different. The former can be said to show 
more explicitly the relationships between urban and rural areas, while the latter 
tends to highlight various inter-relationships within the rural communities themselves. 
One of the deficiencies of the earlier studies was their failure to distinguish this 
point. 
II Historical Position of the Public Works Program for Relief to Farmers 
It should be remembered, to begin with, the Public Works Program for Relief 
were not the result of demand from rural farmers. Those who started the move 
. -ment for relief to farmers advocated for moratorium, and in response to this, and 
as an alternative, the two leading political parties and the government came up with 
the Public Works Program for Relief.!2) What was the reason for this? In the 
paper titled "Formation of Public Works for Relief to Farmers", Akira Tamaki po-
sitioned it in the context of social transition following the First World War and 
thought that bureaucrats played a key role to introduce public works in the wake of 
Showa Panic. l3l He, however, did not explain why then the bureaucrats had to 
promote public works. From nOw on, we shall try to understand the process of intro-
duction of the Public Works Program for Relief. 
a) Historical Premise r!f Public Undertakings by the Ministry of Interior 
Historical facts of public works by the Ministry of Interior clearly shows that 
the Ministry's undertakings to construct roads, embankments and port facilities were 
corresponding to the development of traffic and energy resources as means of pro-
duction under the monopoly capitalism. For instance, number of automobiles increa-
sed from 3,869 in 1919 to 80,000 in 1929, causing an acute need for improvement and 
extension of public roads.''' In the area of flood contra!, the second half of 1920s 
·was'the period when the- focus of public spending shifted from conventional"flood· 
control to development of water resources as hydro-electric power generation (output 
of which grew from 820,000 kw in 1912 to 2,950,000 kw in 1929), and as a result, 
work method switched from "low water river work" type to "high water work" type 
12) Japan Agricultural Research Institute, Japan Agricultural Yearbook, Vol. I, 1932 (in Japa~ 
nese), contains detailed account of the situation. 
13) Akira Tamaki, "Kyuna Doboku Jigyo enD Michi" (Formation of Public Works for Relief 
to Farmers) in Nason Kenkyu (Journal of Rural Community Studies), No. 40, March, 1975 (in 
Japanese). 
14) Growth of automobile Transportation was spectacular at that time, "Towards 1927-28, 
trucking indu:5try became a serious menace to railways. It became clear, by 1929, that 
such lines like Kita-Kyushu Branch, Maizuru and Yokohama were unlikely to be able to 
complete, and under these circumstances, administration of land vehicle transport waS 
transfered from the Ministry of Postal Affairs to the Ministry of Railways in 1928. In 
the following year, the Ministry set up the Vt:hic1e Transport Bureau in order to supervise 
and control vehicle transport business with regular service". Ref. Jishaken, ed., jidos}u, 
Binran (Automobile Directory). 1943 (in Japanese), ho-p.3. 
-~.-' 
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with construction of dam gates and embankments.15) Due to more intense utiliza-
tion of river waters, and the need to prevent disasters which might result from it, 
the importance of water-course related construction work grew day by day. On the 
other hand, volume of cargo-handling at Japanese ports increased from 84 million 
tons to 130 million tons during the same period (from 1919 to 1929). This of course 
was due to the development of industry at large, but we must bear in mind that 
vessels themselves became much larger in the meantime, making improvement of 
port facilities an essential task for the public bodies.!" 
Thus, the two decades of 20s and 30s was a period in which the country faced 
a grave shortage of industrial infrastructures to meet the rapid development of capi-
talism. The nation's roads, rivers and ports needed constant improvement and 
expansion. The growth of heavy industry in the 30s further intensified the needs. 
In the meantime, so-called the "rice riot" of 1918 caused the government to 
introduce countermeasures against unemployment for the first time in. history, but 
prior to 1925, the government employment agency and return-home-to-farm policy 
represented the only answerrs in this regard. 17 ) However, unemployment became a 
serious social issue in 1925, and during the year, six major cities and Osaka Prefec-
ture started to undertake public works during winter season as a means of securing 
jobs for unemployed urban citizens. This marked the start of the unemployment 
relief work in Japan. l 8! 
As the Showa Panic became even more series, relief measures had to be extended. 
The relief work was now pursued throughout the year, open to all people where 
unemployment rate remained high. The recommendations made in 1929 by the Coun-
cil for Social Policy resulted in further expansion of unemployment relief work. 
Firstly, even those districts where rate of unemploYluent was not significant were now 
able to undertake relief work if it contributed to reduce unemployment in surround-
ing districts suffering from higher jobless ratio. Secondly, in addition to prefectures 
and local municipalities, irrigation associations, arable land readjustment associa-
tions, forestry associations and two other cooperation unions were now entitled to 
receive low interest loans, namely agrarian and forest public works was added to the 
list. Finally, the government now undertook to subsidize those works in which more 
than 50% expenditures was to be spent on materials of domestic origin, by paying 
at least 10% of labor cost of such undertakings, for the reason that they could reduce 
15) "Nihon Dobokushi Hensyuiinkai" (Editorial Committee for History of Civil Engineering 
in Japan), Nihon Doboku.shi 1909-1941 (History of Civil Engineering ill Japan - 1909 fa 1941), 
Society of Civil Engineering, 1965 (in Japanese), p. 36. 
16) for development of marine transport. see Yoshio Ando and Sadao MatslIyoshi. eeL, .-\Tippo" 
J"usoshi (Histor)' of Transport in Japan), Nippon Hyoronsha, 1971 (in Japanese). 
17) The comments that follows are mainly those from the Ministry of Interior, Showa 7/8 
nendo Shitsugyo Okyu Jigyo Gaiyo (Summary if Emergency Cou1ltermeasures Taken again-ft Unem· 
plo~vment during Fiscal Years 1932/33), 1935 (in Japanese). 
18) Yasoji Kazahaya, Nippoll Shakai Scisakushi (History Q/ Social Policies in Japa1l), Vol. 2, Aoki 
Bunko, 1951 (in Japanese), p. 360. 
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indirectly the ratio of unemployment. This is a significant policy because it aimed 
to turn mere wasted expenses for capital to relief unemployed workers into a posi-
tive means of accumulation of capital. 
In spite of all this, however, unemployment situation became sO acute in 1931 to 
be left to the discretion of local authorities. The government thus started directly to 
undertake public works, of which construction of national roads by the Ministry of 
Interior was a typical example. Similarly, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
started works relating to improvement of arable land, forestry road construction and 
other public works to cope with unemployment of rural population. The Ministry of 
Postal Affairs and the Ministry of Railways also started unemployment relief work 
of their own. 
The Saito Coalition Cabinet which was organized in May, 1932, introduced the 
"5-Year Plan for Public Works to Promote Industry" with a view to take even more 
positive steps to make public works a key means of fight against unemployment and, 
at the same time, development of industrial infrastructures. According to the plan, 
the state was to disburse 375 million yen in five years On works related to road 
construction (national and prefectural), embankments and port facilities. It became 
the prototype of the Public Works Program for Relief to be undertaken by the Mini-
stry of Interior. 
This shows that during the decade of 1930s, unemployment relief work of Japan 
drastically changed its character in the wake of needs for more social means of 
labor and worsening unemployment situation, both resulting from development of the 
monopoly capitalism. In contrast to the primary stress on relief to the unemployed, 
the new policies set their main aim to industrial development, in which relief to the 
unemployed nOw became a secondary purpose. Moreover, whereas the earlier pro-
grams ware limited to large cities, the later pOlicy was extended to medium. an.d .. 
smaller cities and finally to rural areas. Put in other words, it may be said that 
relief to the unemployed now assumed the character of measures for expansion of 
domestic market, which capital adopted positively as a means of accumulation. 
b) Histrical Premise 'If Public Works Undertaken by the Ministry 'If Agriculture and Forestry 
As stated earlier, it was toward 1930 that agriculture-related public works became 
a means of relief to the jobless, but the history of government subsidy to such works 
goes back to 1908 when works for readjustment of arable land became to eligible such 
support. l9l The rice riot of 1918 clealy showed inadequacy of food supply and the 
need for more agricultural output. Accordingly, governmental subsidies On develop-
ment of arable land (1921) and on improvement of irrigation and drainage lines 
(1923) were started, and in the same process, the subsidies were made available not 
19) The description to follo.w were taken from the History of Civil Engineering in Japan, ibid., 
and from Agricultural Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Dai Juichiji 
Kochi Kalcuclzo Kairyo Ji-gyo Yoran (Summary of the 11th Program for EXpatlsion and Improvement 
of Arable Land)J 1936 (in Japanese). For more details, Viz. Tetsu Tamaki, ibid. 
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only to landowners but to farmers as well. Thus, the share of subsidies paid to 
small scale undertakings increased gradually. 
As a number of experts pointed out already, the upper class farmers, including 
resident landowners, became the main promoters of improvement of arable land 
during the Taisho Era (1910 to 1925) and Showa Era which followed.20) Therefore, 
public subsidization of agricultural undertakings meant not only growth of foodstuff 
production and stabilization of landowner-tenant relationships, but also a boon to the 
upper class farmers including resident landlords. This assured on the one hand low 
price of rice = low wages to the monopoly capitalism, where on the other hand caused 
disintegration of farmers. 
Then, as the recommendations made in 1929 by the Council for Social Policy 
stated that "the agricultural and forestry public works must promote local industry, 
secondary sources of income of farming (and fishering) villages, welfare of rural 
villages and ~standard of living of farmers, along with utilization of workforce during 
winter and other off-peak seasons with a view to prevent excessive concentration of 
population to large cities and to realize adequate distribution of population among 
regions by smooth movement of people within and outside of the country"2D, these 
public works were undertaken in order to create additional job opportunities in rural 
economy and to ensure work for poorer farmers. 
It is now clear that the Public v\lorks Program for Relief to Farmers were more 
than an attempt of bureaucrats but a necessary consequence of historical importance. 
As the Japanese economy towards 1930 was going to develop heavy industry under 
the monopoly capitalism, and while the industry faced both shortage of social means 
of labor as well as growing unemployment at the same time, public works undertaken 
by the Ministry of Interior represented a comprehensive and capitalistic approach to 
Overcome the dilemma, while those adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forest-
ry were means of assistance to upper class farmers and promotion of secondary job 
in order to satisfy the needs for cheap rice and wages on the part of the capital. 
Finally, these public works had an additional historical significance in that they were 
being integrated into a comprehensive regional policy for rural development, unlike 
the earlier measures against unemployment while lacked consistency and coordina-
tion. 
III Practice of Public Works Undertaken by the Ministry of Interior 
The public works undertaken 
embankments and port facilities. 
by the Ministry of Interior 
While they were based on the 
concerned roads, 
"5-Year Plan for 
20) An example can be seen in Naraomi Imamura et aI., Tochi Kair.vo Hyakunenshi (100 years 
o( Undertaking" for Improvement q( Arable Land), Heibonsha, 1977 !in Japanese l. Part II, 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
21) The Social Affairs Bureau of Ministry of lnterior, ibid., p. 47. 
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Public Works to Promote of Industry" already refered to, the Ministry tried to 
accelerate work schedule as well as to give them greater scale. Tatsuo Yamamoto. 
who was the Minister of Interior at that time, stated that the purpose of these under-
takings was "to promote public works all over the country and to give job opportu-
nities to poor rural population, so that people can find work and derive additional 
income to become self-sufficient in the long run, so that they can contribute to the 
growth of local industry".'" We are to see how these undertakings were implemented 
and what effect they had on rural economy. Thus, works on port facilities are 
excluded from the scope of this study. 
a) Improvement qf Road 
We have already seen that much work was done in this regard not only by the 
state, but also by prefectural and municipality governments under generous subsidy 
(75% for communal roads, and 33% for prefectural roads). It is worth mentioning 
that the Public Works Program for Relief opened the way for state subsidy to 
improvement of roads under the management of local communities as cities, towns 
and villages. 
First, with regard to those municipal roads~ all construction works were, in 
principle, to be directly undertaken by the municipalities concerned, according to a 
direction sent by Karasawa. then Director of Public Works of the Ministry. It said 
that "if it is necessary to appoint a contractor due to unavoidable reasons, the con-
tract must require employment of the local population", and "all works must give 
in principle preferential opportunity to the local inhabitants", and "also in principle, 
wages must be paid on daily basis" .23) Clearly, the primary purpose was to give work 
opportunities to poor farmers. 
I have not yet had access to any data showing the scale of works undertaken 
on the national level, but some data are available regarding those in Nara Prefecture. 
The Prefecture's "Directions concerning Subsidy for Development of Farming Villa-
ges"'''. tells us that almost all of the work took no more than 500 to 1,000 yen per 
item, though construction of national roads costed 50,000 to 1,300,000 yen per item. 
Yet, a total amount of 81,650,000 yen was spent during fiscal years 1932 to 1934 for 
construction of municipal roads across the nation. Assuming that each work costed 
22) Roseiso, "Nason Shinko Seisaku a Gisuru Naimubucho· Dobokubu Kacho Kaigi a No-
zoite" (A Glimpse Over the Meeting of the Director of Interior Affairs and Manager of 
Public Works Bureau over the Policy for Development of Farming Villages) in Dorono 
Kairyo (Road Improvement). Vol. 14, No.9, September, 1932, (in Japanese) and especially 
p. 109 on "Yamamoto Naimu Daijin Kunji Yoshi" (Summary of the Instruction made 
by Interior Minister Yamamoto). 
21) Ibid., p. Ilion "Noson Shinko Dobokujigyono Shikkonikansuru Dobokukyokucho Shiji" 
(Direction of the Director of Public Works Regarding Implementation of Public "Vorks 
for Development of Farming Village). 
2-1:) These data were taken from 82 records contained in _VOSOIl Shinko HoJyortitatsu (Directions 
conceming Subsidy for Development Farming Villages J 1932 ........ 34) of Public 'Works Section, Nara 
Prefecture (in Japanese), at Nara Prefectural Library. 
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1,000 yen on the average, this means that more than 80,000 works were undertaken 
in Japan at that time, and this shows a large number of farmers were able to earn 
some money as the res ul t. 
With regard to national roads, we know that during fiscal years 1932 to 1934, the 
government had several hudgets in addition to "Emergency Relief Spending", such 
as for example "Promotion of Industry", "Unemployment Measures", "Assistance to 
Farming Village", "Emergency Aid to Rural Community", and so On. However, it 
should be remembered that road construction works under the slogan of industrial 
development were in fact aiming to provide work for the unemployed. Moreover. 
it was not unusual that works were undertaken on the same road and during the 
same fiscal year using different budget items, or that works continued on a same 
road from year to year under different budgets. These facts tell us that budgetar)" 
titles were not really meaningful, and that works were undertaken in accordance 
.-with comprehensive plans not tightly governed by specific budgets. For these reasons, 
it would be in order for us to take all works related to construction of national 
roads en bloc, at leas t for the time period in question. 
Table 1 shows results of construction of national roads in three fiscal years. Total 
works completed reached 173, covering the distance of 170 km (7% of total national 
roads). Of these roads, CD, @, ,1) and ® took more than 50% in terms of number 
of works, distance and expenditures. On the other hand, Figure 1 shows geographic 
distribution of these works completed in three fiscal years. We can see, first of all, 
that construction works were concentrated to these major industrialized areas such 
as Keiyo (around Tokyo and Chiba), Keihin (around Tokyo and Yokohamai, Chu-
kyo (around Nagoyai. Hanshin (around Osaka and Kobe) and Kita-Kyushu 
(around Yawata and Kokura) districts. The map also shows large number of works 
done in Hoku-Shin-Etsu and Tohoku trunk roads and those around big local cities. 
Lastly, we notice that practically, there were almost no construction works done in 
San-in and Shikoku regions. This shows that contrary to the "relief to rural village" 
slogan. priority was given to four major industrialized zones and to large cities, 
consistent with the development of capitalism. 
As to breakdown of construction costs, the survey made in 1932, on national 
roads under the direct management of the state shows that labor and material costs 
represent 65.7% of total expenditure, followed by land acquisition costs (13.7%) and 
compensations paid for removal of residential buildings (8.8%)25). 
Labor represented the largest component of total costs at 31.6%. An official 
directive required that for construction of national roads, "first priority should be 
given to those who were in need of work to be introduced by the public labor ex-
change, and then to those who are specified by members of local welfare committee, 
25) Teiichi Endo, "Showa 7 nendo Kuni Chokkatsu Kokudo Kairyo Kojini Tsuite" (Road 
Improvement Works Directly Undertaken by the State in Fiscal Year 1932) in Dorond 
Kairyo (Road Improvement), Vol. 17, No.7, July, 1935 (in Japanese), p. 155. 
Table I Results of Construction of National Roads (total of three fiscal years) 
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4 Tokyo-U tsunomiya-Sendai-Aomori 
.J Fukushillla-Y onezawa-Aki ta-Aolllori 
6 Tokyo-Mito-Iwanuma 
7 ',Tokyo-Chiba 
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* total distance of all national roads (excludes military road) at the beginning of fiscal year 1934 
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Source: Public \Vorks Bureau of the :Ministry of Interior, Chokkatsu Koji Nenpo (Annual Report of Public rVorks Directly Undertake by 
t.~c State), 1933, 1934; Teichi Endo, '(Sh6wa 7 nendo Kuni Chokkatsu Kokudo Kairyo Kojini Tsuite" (Road Improvement 
\\'orks Directry Undertaken by the State in 1932) in Dorono Kairyo (Road Improvement), Vol. 17, No.7. July, 1935. 







Note: .... , a point of the construction; -CD-~ a route of the national road 
and the route number. There are not a record of construction in 
Hokkaido and Okinawa Prefecture. 
SouTce: Public "\larks Bureau of the Ministrr of Interior, Chokkatsu .Koji 
.VeT/po CAmmal Report of Public l+'orks Directly Undertaken by the State), 
1933, 1934; Teiichi Endo, "Showa 7 nendo Kuni Chokkatsu Kokudo 
Kairyo Kojini Tsuite" (Road Improvement ''''arks Directory Un-
dertaken by the State in 1932) in DoroTio Kniryo (Road Improvement), 
Vol. 17, No.7, July, 1935. 
Figure 1 Geographic Distribution of Construction of National Roads 
(total of three fiscal years) 
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police officers and the like to be in need of relief; so that at least 70% of total work-
force must come from these groups, unless other unavoidable circumstances apply."'G) 
This opened the way for local poor people to find work, and during these three fiscal 
years (1932 to 34), 2,576,000 man-days were employed in 1932, 5,876,000 in 1933, and 
4,259,000 in 1934.27) 
26) Direction of Social Affairs Bureau~ the Ministry of Interior, May 1, 1931, in ibid., p. 10J 
(in Japanese). 
27) Ibid., p. 349 et seq., and Takeo Fujita, Nippon Shihonshugi to Zaisei (japanese Capitalism and 
Public Finance), Vol. 2, Jitsugyono Nipponsha, 1949 (in Japanese), p. 200 et seq. 
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As to material costs. the survey of 1932 shows that of total of 3,600,000 yen. 
1,650,000 yen was cement, 670,000 yen was for gravels, 590,000 yen was for steel, and 
350,000 was spent for lumber materials, indicating that use of cement and steel 
products was considerable.28) This created a strong demand for these products and 
greatly contributed business recovery of that related industry, as Ryoichi Miwa 
pointed out earlier.29) 
So then, what were the effects of those road construction works on rural economy? 
According to a report of the time on social effects of construction of forestry road, 
the works not only meant cash income for inhabitants but resulted in (1) develop-
ment of unexploited forests, (2) saving of transportation cost of forestry products 
and higher value of forest utility, and (3) saving of transportation costs in general 
and rise of land value.30) 
To be sure, road construction works were a boon to rural economy, but there 
were also stories about the entire villages wiped out by new roads.3D Tsunao Inoma~ 
ta reported, for instance, of a typical case as follows: "because of many new roads, 
trucks now come to places where charcoals are made, and those lousy smelling mon-
sters carry cu( bulks of charcoal one after another. This is a terrible blow to poor 
farmers who used to make straw bags for charcoal and [hen transport them to oven, 
and also to carry charcoal bags down to their village. Even women and children 
worked like that, and they were thus able to earn some money which was not negli-
gible for them. Now the opportunity was lost for them forever." Thus, new roads 
brought capitalism to remote villages, changing drastically their lifestyle and econo-
Illy. 
Next, Table 2 shows that large-scale development of major national as well as 
prefectural roads resulted in a rapid growth of automobile transportation industry. 
We see, for example, that from 1930 to 1936, growth of the industry in terms of 
number of companies and amount of their paid-in capital was far above the average 
of those of all joint stock companies in Japan. Also, we notice that growth of paid 
-in capital was especially significant in local areas, led by those companies operating 
in Kyushu and Tohoku regions. The foundation of Japan Express Ltd, in 1937, as a 
national policy cOncern bears witness to the emerging importance of vehicle transport 
28) Teiichi Endo, ibid., p. 155. 
29) The fact that road works and other public works undertaken under the Emergency Relief 
Measures benefited tremendously manufacturing industry of Japan can be seen in Ryoichi 
Miwa, "Takahashi Zaiseiki no Keizai Seisaku" (Economic Polley of the Minister of Finance 
under Takahashi) in the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo, ed., Facismki 
no Kokkato Shakai (The Nation a"d Society during Faci.~t Regime), Vol. 2, Tokyo University 
Press, 1979 (in Japanese). 
30) Akita Forestry Branch Office, KokuYll Rinya Jimoto Nosan Cyosonni Okeru KYll1wjigyo Narabini 
Sono Kokano Gaiyo (Public Works for Relief to 'nhabitants In the National Forests and Outline oj' 
Their Effects), 1975 (in Japanese), p. 6. 
31) Tsunao Inomata, Kyubono Noson (Impol.JCrished Villages), 1934, reprinted edition in 1978, 
Nobunkyo (in Japane,e), p. 334. 
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Contracting I. Automobile Transportation I' Public Works 
: Coml'any Company Numbe:Cr:-::o-rf~-~i ---- -~'..N"=u~m:=':b~eC:r-o=f---, -P-e-r-c-e-n-t-
__ c",o:.;m=panies ;1 Percent I __ c:::o:c:m=panies 1 
1930 1933 1936 11930.1936 1930 1933 1936 1930: 1936 
~--~--~----~--~-------
56 86 1031100 184 [ 40 54 62 100. 155 
83· 121 192 . 100 231 1 26 49 90 100. 346 
140· 177 216 100 1541 71 129 149 100. 210 
79 84 115 i 100 146 35 56 80 100; 230 








411 623[' 100 226 I 174 251 327 100; 188 
147 194 ! 100 169 31 40 . 57 100' 184 
85 101 100 135 i 14 28 33 100' 236 
167 2181100 287 28 52 81 100: 289 
161 242 100 233 227 312 388 100; 171 
1,669 2,294 1100 194 752 1,129 1,439 100 191 
"i" 
i51,910 71,196 ,87,511 , 100 
, 
169 
.... -....... f" _. 
I 
.~a~~~ft(~ili~~-~en) ...... 1 81. 3 
. ....... I . . 
1711113.1 122.4 159.1 J 100 i 141 93.2 138.9 100 
All Industry (Billion Yen) 19.6 20. 0 24. 0 100 122 ! 
Sourre: Statistics Section of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Kaisya Tokeihyo (Statis-
tics of Companies), 1930, 1933, 1936. 
industry.32) The table is interesting also because it shows rapid growth of public 
works contracting companies and tlis increased at a rate even higher than that of 
automobile transportation companies mainly in local areas. Of course, these contrac-
tors did not Eve on road construction alone, but it seems certain that their success 
owed a lot to the Public ''Yorks Program for Relief and this in turn allowed them to 
penetrate into regional economic structure. 
b) River Improvement Works 
The most important characteristic of river improvement works undertaken as a 
part of the Public Works Program for Relief is that in contrast to works in the past, 
medium to small rivers were now became eligible for improvement work. Previously, 
works on large rivers were directly undertaken by the state. Under the Emergency 
Relief Measures, however, the government appropriated an amount of 61,662,000 yen 
in three fiscal years, and the amount was used to subsidize 50% of costs of improve-
32) In 1935. bus traffic represented 31.90' of total passengers utilizing land transport. In the 
same year, automobiles transported 64% of total tonnage of freight on land. Road 
Transportation Bureau of the Ministry of Construction, Dora Tokei Nenpo 1957 (Road 
Statistic Year-book), 1957 (in Japanese). For more detai1s, refer to Ando and Matsuyoshi, 
ibid. 
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ment works on 39 medium to small rivers, apart from acceleration of works directly 
undertaken by the state. The subsidies were to be used at the discretion of prefec-
tural governments in charge. Furthermore, tlose works undertaken by local munici-
palities now became eligible for the state subsidy of 75% of costs.3" 
As to the impact of those river improvement works over rural economy, the new 
works were mostly those called "high water river work" which consists of dikes, em-
bankments and barrages to allow construction of dams. High dikes were effective to 
prevent floods, but it had a far-reaching consequence on the traditional orders of 
irrigation. That is to say, the traditional irrigation system at Japanese village was 
so-called "natural down-flow type" built around those medium to small rivers, and 
this usually gave the right of irrigation control to the village community and to 
landowners in particular.34 ) The advent of modern system, however, required con-
struction of watergates and pumping stations or neW water ways alongside the river, 
which meant a significant change of outside environment for the traditional order of 
irrigation system. 
In fact, a number of conflict arose In conjunction with nver improvement. 
According to Taichi Uzaki, disputes over agriculture-oriented and other uses of water 
occurred most frequently out of new river improvement works. He stated, quoting 
a study report made in April, 1935 and titled Examples '!! Damages to Agricultural 
Irrigation caused by River Improvement, that "in total, there were 47 cases of such 
damages: 22 due to the drop of river bed and 6 due to alteration of river course, 
all causing shortage of irrigation water, 8 cases where irrigation system was but by 
salination, 8 cases resulting in insufficient drainage, 4 cases where irrigation channel 
was cut off completely, and 7 other cases."'5) 
The biggest motive behind the development of high-water system, which forced 
fundamental change in the traditional irrigation system, was of course the _need for 
hydro-electric power. Electric power companies always had advantage over users of 
irrigation system in their dispute regarding water rights.") In considering these 
facts, it would be reasonable to conclude that the river improvement works consis-
tently promoted shift of control power over water rights from landowners to electric 
power companies, thereby contributing to changes in the traditional orders of agri-
cultural irrigation in those concerned areas. 
Lastly, a few words will be in order regarding the systematic character of the 
public works which the Ministry of Interior undertook for improvement of roads, 
rivers and port facilities. The Emergency Relief Measures completed its mission on 
schedule in three fiscal years of implementation. However, the Public Works Council 
33) Viz. llistory of Civil Engineering in Japan 3 ibid., p. 13. 
34) An example is Taichi Uzaki, Nogyo Doboku Gyosei (Public Administration and Public ~Vorks), 
Sho:zanbo, 1941 (in Japanese), p. 130. See also Yozo 'Watanabe, Nogyo Suiriken no Kenkyu 
(Study of Agricultural Water Rights), Tokyo University Press, 1954 (in Japanese). 
35) Taichi Uzaki, ibid., p. 213. 
36) Y020 Watanabe, ibid., p. 452. 
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established in 1933 developed the Second Plan for Road Improvement and the Second 
River Improvement Plan, and these were able to carry forward the systematic invest-
ment of the state in the social means of labor. 37l 
IV Practice of Public Works Undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry 
a) Outline if Works 
The Ministry was lfl charge of three different types of public works, which were 
those on arable land, those concerning forestry (forestation, sand dune prevention, 
forestry road construction, etc.) and works for construction of fishing port facilities. 
For the purpose of this study, we will exclude the last two types and discussion will 
be made only for public works on arable land. In this area again, there were several 
items including those large-scale 2-year reclamation (work in excess of five cho = 
2.45 acres x 5), trunk irrigation/drainage line improvement (involving beneficiary area_ 
in excess of 500 cho = 2.45 acres x 500), small-scale reclamation (less than 5 cho, 
excluding restoration works), smaller scale irrigation/drainage improvement (benefi-
ciary area less than 500 cho), underdrainages, construction of auxiliary facilitias such 
as watergates and bridges, and so on. Because of this, the entities who undertook 
these works included not only prefectural governments but municipalities, arable land 
readjustment associations, irrigation associations and even individuals. 
The state provided high subsidies to these works, and in addition, offered low-
cost loans to alleviate local burden. The Public Works Program for Relief was a 
major step forward to promote the whole scheme of increasing agricultural subsidy. 
According to Naraomi Imamura, the Ministry's budget for public works grew not 
only in amounts but also in numbers of subsidy payments, because they were now 
available to smaller undertakings.38 ) Simultaneously, the manner of financing under-
went a significant change, in that the Deposit Bureau of the Ministry of Finance 
was now authorized to extend loans directly to local municipalities without going 
over the traditional channels via Nippon Kangyo Bank, Noko Bank or Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank. Deferment of repayment and interest subsidy also became avai-
lable with a view to promote public works by means of financial assistance.") 
37) Okasumikai, Naimushoshi (History ()f the Ministry of Interior), Vol. 2, Chiho Zaimu Kyokai, 1971 
(in J:lpane~e), p. 9 et suq. Harumaru Inoue states that the Public Works Program for 
Relief allowed cono,;truction of national roads to be done in a systematical way, and this 
marked an epoch in the history of automobile road construction in Japan. See Inoue, 
Nippon Shihonshugino Hattcnto Nogyo o)'ohi Nosci (Development oj J{1panese Capitalism, Agriculture 
and Agrarian Policy), ChUD Koronsha, 1957 (in Japanese), p. 365. 
38) Naraomi Imamura, Hojokinto Nogyo. Noson (Subsidy and Agricultures/Village), leno Hikari 
Kyokai, 1979 (in Japanese), p. 110. 
39) For further details, see Shintaro Yoshida, "Takahashi Zaiseikano Chiho Zaisei" (Local 
Finance under the Fiscal Policy of the Ministry of Finance during Takahashi's Ministry) 
in Kohachiro Takahashi, et., Nippon Kindaikano Kenkyu (Study of Modernization of japan), 
Vol. 2, Tokyo University Press, 1976 (in Japanese), p. 421 
Table 3 Results of the Public ''''arks on Arable Land (total of three fiscal years) 
Item 
large scale 2-year reclamation 
small scale reclamation 
trunk irrgation/drainage line improvement 
smaller scale irrigation/drainage improvement 
underdrainage 
construction of auxiliary facilities 
total 
------------- -- ---------
* J cho=2.45 acres ** restoration work 
Subsidy payment 

















Number of works Beneficiary area 
--------
-_._---
Number Percent Cho* Percent 
. - ----------- - ----------------
1,613 1.0 18,112 0.9 
77. 163 46. I 96, 751 5.0 
(4,542** ) (59, 260**) : 
148 O. I 164,745 8,5 
29,912 17.9 802,212 41. 4 
10,335 6.2 12,442 0.6 
48,266 28. 7 844, 112 43.6 
167,437 100.0 1,938,374 100.0 
---
Source: Agricultural Bureau of the 1v1inistry of Agriculture and Forestry, Dai Juichiji Kochi Kakucho Kairyo Jigyo Yorall (Summary 
qf Ihe 11th Program for Expansion and Improvement oj Arable Land), 1936. 
Table 4 Results of the Agricuhural Public 'Vorks by District (total of three fi.scal years) (cho=2.45 acres) 
2-year reclamation Small r~c1amation* i Tr~nk irrigation/ Smaller irrigation/l U nderdrainage Auxiliary 
, I dramage . ~rai~~g~ _____ fscilities District ------
Ricefields Fields Ricefie!~ls fields Beneficiary area Beneficiary a rea Beneficiary area Beneficiary area 
Hokkaido 
I ° 
0 0 5,190 0 H,9'>5 981 1,971 
Tohoku 2,683 2,537 3,663 4,752 30,839 168,975 2,658 150,209 
Kanto 1,492 2,175 1,600 7,285 89,977 95,719 2,225 180,631 (includes Tokyo) 
Bokuriku 694 309 845 383 13,963 56,337 626 93,059 
Tosan Tokai 698 1,873 920 2,989 38,503 65,678 918 161,511 
Kinki 179 1,186 190 1,781 8,525 80,839 369 60,485 
Chugoku 305 801 317 939 16,259 79,903 1,792 76, H2 
Shikoku 184 566 166 1,665 3, 167 57,005 146 41,578 
Kyushu 686 2,052 1,248 3,925 10,826 79,240 2,986 85,807 
Okinawa 0 178 25 156 0 795 () 4,15+ 
Total 6,921 '! 11,677 8,974 I 29,065 212,059 728,H6 12,701 855,847 
* excludes restoration 'works 
SOIlHC: Agricultural Bureau of the J\'1inistry of Agriculture and Forestry, Kochi Kakucho Kairyo Jigyo Yowu (SummaJY 0/ Program 
for EXPOIlSiOlI alld Im/Jrovemrnl oj Arable Land), 1934, 1935, 1936. 
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b) Results of Undertaking 
Results accomplished under the agricultural public works program are summarI-
zed in Table 3. Distriction between the "areal undurtakings" (reclamation and 
underdrainage for instance) and "linear undertakings" (drainage improvement and 
construction of auxiliary facilities) apart, the table shows eloquently the whole scale 
of undertakings regarding cultivated land spaces, attaining almost one third of the 
country's total cultivated area at that time. The number of works undertaken 
reached 167,000 in three fiscal years. In considering the distressed status of japanese 
farming villages in general at that time, such a policy of scattered spending, inclu-
ding those under the rural public works program, was in fact a necessity. Further-
more, the table shows that 75% of the amount spent as subsidy was applied to small-
scale works, and that individuals (42.4%) and associations (33.4%) accounted for the 
absolute majority of number of works undertaken.40 ) This would mean that the policy 
was quite effective to restore confidence among farmers. 
Next, Table 4 illustrates regional characteristics of the agricultural public worKs 
program. First, we notice that in terms of square measures, reclamation of fields 
stood above that of ricefields, except in Tohoku and Hokuriku areas where monocul-
ture of rice was prevalent. Also, the average square measure per one small-scale 
reclamation work in Hokuriku was 1.6 cho (2.45 acres x 1.6), which is far large than 
those in Tohoku and Kyushu (0.7 eho on the average). Second, while construction 
of trunk irrigation/drainage lines occupied an important part of the works done in 
Eastern japan, much of the works undertaken in Western japan were irrigation/drai-
nage lines of smaller scale. Third, whereas underclraining works were extensively 
done in Kyushu, Tohoku and Kanto areas, they were not so frequent in Hokuriku 
and Kinki. Thus, the public works done by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestrv 
showed considerable diversity among different regions in japan. 
e) Impact if Public Works 011 Rural Economy 
Initially, these public works had the main aim of distributing wages for the 
benefit of rural farmers. In this regard, the data published by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry indicate that during these three fiscal years, aggregate total 
number of workers employed for these works attained 112,530,000, who received the 
total wages of 82,140,000 yen or 73% of the total cost of works.4D In principle, the 
workers were to be recruited from among the poor and registered jobless people in 
the region, although in smaller scale works, the undertaking entities were often 
individuals, and they tended to employ their own family members.(2) 
40) Agricultural Bureau of' tht' Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, ibid. 
41) Ibid. 
42) Agricultural Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Jikyoku Kyokyu Koic-
hi Kankei Nogyo Doboku Jigyono Gaiyo Narabini Sanko Jitsurei (The Outline and Some Actual 
Examples of Public and Irrigation 1-1lorks for Promotion oj Agriculture under the Emergency Relief 
Program, J934 (in Japanese). 
43) Akita Forestry Branch Office, ibid., p. 34. 
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Then, how were the wages spent by the farmers? According to a survey made on 
spending of the wage income at Yamase Village in Akita Prefecture, 60% of the 
income was used as living expenses, followed by repayment of loans and payment 
of taxes (5% each).43) Another report made by the Akita District Forestry Office 
indicated that the wage income contributed to reduce number of schoolchildren 
coming to school without lunch, as well as to increase rate of school attendance and 
participation to postal life insurance schemes. Also, more people were able to pay 
for their medical and electrical bills in arrearage.") It is then clear that the wage 
income earned by those poor people hardly remained in their pockets, quickly con-
sumed by daily necessities, taxes and repayment of their debts. The wage income 
as no more than a temporary relief to the poor, who were in constant need of some 
bywork to live on. In short, the relief program offered little solution to their chronic 
fear of complete destitution. 
Cost of land aquisition was not a significant portion of the total expenditures 
for the public works. In the case of Hyogo Prefecture, it amounted to no more than 
10% of total costs, much less than material costS.,5) 
Next, we need to consider ultimate results of those reclaimed field and irrigation/ 
drainage systems built by the vast number of farmers. We have already seen that 
the most part of raclamation, which aimed extension of arable land for increased 
output, was undertaken by individuals, and that in Tohoku and Hokuriku regions, 
reclamation meant more often extension of rice cultivation rather types of agricul-
ture. An important question here is who were those individuals and where they stood 
in the hierarchy or class of farmers. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive data 
to provide direct answer to the question. There are, however, some information 
which gives as if partially SOme ideas concerning this aspect. 
First, in the case of reclamation works undertaken by non-individual entities such 
as field readjustment associations and village municipalities, the fields thus created 
newly were often leased to these "expert" farmers.") Second, in Hyogo Prefecture, 
most of small-scale reclamation produced fields for crops other than rice, where or-
chard trees, tobacco, peppermint and other "commercial" crops were planted.4(7) This 
reflects growth of market-oriented agriculture around large cities, which in Tohoku 
and Hokuriku, rice remained the only viable crop, and the share of rice field con-
tinued to increase. 
With regard to the effect of new irrigation systems on rural economy, we notice 
above all that they contributed to increase of output per square measure. According 
44) Ibid., p. 7 et seq. 
45) Economic Department of Hyogo Prefecture, Showa 8 nendo Nason Shirlko Nogyo DobokuJigyo 
Jisshi Gaiyo (The Summary of Public ~-Vorks Undertaken in Fiscal Year 1933 for Developmellt of 
Farming Village), 1935 (in Japanese), was used as the source of data cited here. 
46) Ibid., Agricultural Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Jikyoku Kyokyu 
Kochi Kankei Nogyo Doboku Jigyollo Gaikyo oyobi Sallko Jitsurei. 
47) Economic Department of Hyogo Prerectun:, ibid., pp. 14-18. 
-"."0:..--
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to a survey made by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in the Eastern Japan, 
improvement of irrigation systems resulted in an increase of 130% per square mea-
sures (in terms of price), and 162% in case of improvement of underdrainage.4B) 
In Saga Prefecture, where rice production reached the highest level after the Great 
Depression, more than 20% or total arable land benefitted from construction of small 
-scale irrigation/drainage systems, and it is certain that this was one of the reasOns 
for achievement of the success at this prefecture, known as "Saga Stage" .49) More-
over, it was mainly those part owners of 1 to 3 cho who played a key role in this 
process. Clearly, there occurred disintegration of the traditional village hierarchy 
due to the public works. The land improvement was possible because of the works 
of rural farmers, and the improvement in agricultural productivity triggered the 
disintegration of old class system, of which Saga Prefecture was a typical example. 
V Conclusion 
We have so far considered separately each of the public works administered by 
the Ministry of Interior and those sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry. In conclusion, it would be in order to make an overall assessment of 
both types of the public works to get a whole picture of the Public Works Program 
for Relief to Farmers. 
First of all, the Public Works Program for Relief were remarkable in their scale 
which surpassed all the earlier agricultural undertakings of the Japanese government. 
They realized, for the first time, basis for rural development and introduction of 
modern civilization into rural villages. In this process, the public works initiated 
by the Ministry of Interior tried to bring into contact cities and villages, capital and 
rural economy, while those undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
developed extensively basic infrastructures needed to upgrade agricultural productivi-
ty of rural economy. Along with road improvement, the public works within villages 
formed a new basis of rural communities in Japan, and this experience was utilized 
again in the postwar period. In this sense, the relief works constitute an essential 
part in the governmental policy of rural development. 
Second, the Public Works Program for Reliefwere greatly marked by their regio-
nal characteristics. Because they were implemented extensively, many of them were 
small in scale, but their political and economical effects were none the less significant. 
48) Ibid" Agricultural Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Jikyoku Kyokyu 
Kochi Kankci Nogyo Duboku Jigyo 110 Gaikyo Narabini Sanko jitsurei. The survey was made 
at seven locations for each, in the year 1933. 
49) For "Saga Stage" refer to Katsujiro Yamada, Kamelo Mayuno Keizai Kozo (The Economic 
Structure of Rice and Silk Cocoon Production), Iwanami Shoten, 1942 and Sadame Tanaka, 
"Sagaken Nogyoron" (Study of Agriculture in Saga Prefecture), originally published in 
Kyushu University, Keizaigaku Kenkyu (Journal of Political Economy), Vol. 9, No.3 and 4, 
}939, reprinted edition, Nobunkyo, in 1978 (in Japanese). 
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These relatively minor undertakings were by no means standardized, but highly 
diverse due to local conditions such as level of development of commercial produc-
tion and natural environment, as seen from those works done in conjunction with 
improvement or reclamation of arable land. However, we should not consider the 
diversity alone as the fundamental characteristics of the Public Works Program for 
Relief in general. As the example of construction of national roads suggests, deve-
lopment of major roads took place in a fairly consistent and well-organized manner. 
In addition to it, contrary to the "relief to rural village" slogan, priority was given 
to four major industrialized zones and to large cities. For this reason, construction 
of national roads tended to expand, rather than diminish, uneven regional develop-
ment. 
Third, the massive spending under the Public Works Program for Relief by way 
of public works provided a temporary relief to poverty stricken population, but it fell 
far short of resulting in a sustained development of rural economy to bring perma-
nent solution to the problem. On the contrary, it provided opportunities for the in-
dustrial capital to expand domestic market for their product and to penetrate into 
the rural economy On the basis of the new infrastructures established through the 
public works. 
Fourth, we must not forget that the new social means of labor and agricultural 
product means paved the way for a gradual but sustained transformation of traditio-
nal structure of rural community, with the result that the poor became even more 
so. This process involved two different aspects. Those public works sponsored by 
the Ministry of Interior tended to act as an external factor to cause transformation 
of the conventional structure of rural communities, while the initiative taken by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry became an internal factor to promote disinte-
gration of the traditional class structure within the communities by means of invest-
ment coming from the state. 
Thus, the Public Works Program for Relief to Farmers constituted an approach 
to create basic infractructure for improvement of agricultural productivity both in 
material as well as social context. Yet l the governmental initiative by no means 
provided a real and permanent relief to poor people in the depressed communities, 
but it involved a strong possibility to result in a systematic reproduction and expan-
sion of poverty in the rural community. We can notice that the state government 
itself was not unaware of the danger, in as much as it started to implement simul-
taneously the "Movement for Reconstruction of Rural Economy" as a permanent 
policy in order to complement the Public Works Program for Relief to Farmers 
which was no more than an emergency measure to provide temporary income to poor 
farmers. 
